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THE ROLE OF THE RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES IN THE WAR IN FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

by Paul Mojzes 1

The starting point of this paper are two premises. The first is that war is the worst form
human interaction. The second is that cooperation among people of diverse ch!lracteristics
(such as race, religion, nationality, gender, etc.) is more important than national sovereignty,
national Lebensraum, traditions, customs, historical boundaries, and so forth. If these
premises are acceptable, then one may claim that the contribution of the religious
communities 2 to the outbreak of the present war in the former Yugoslavia is major while the
contribution of the religious communities toward cessation of hostilities and reconciliation
is minor.
The focus of this paper will be exclusively on the contemporary situation because of my
c~nviction that the historical overview has been offered ad naseum with no new light shed
since each religious community has its own distinct version of history and because presently
history is being mythologized in ever more bizarre and divergent directions, the distinct
purpose of which is not to determine what happened in the past and interpret it for the
present but to provide ammunition for one's claims in the present situation and recall
grievances against other groups in the past so that one may avenge them in the present. 3

1

This paper was originally written for a conference "Religion and Crisis in Eastern Europe After
Communism" in Houston, TX, April 23-25, 1993.
2

The term 'religious communities' will be used here instead of the more customary term
'churches' because the word church is unsuitable for Islam (as well as Judaism but the latter plays
a negligible role in the present conflict). The term 'religious community• is used here in the sense
of an organized institutional formation of adherents of a religious orientation, such as Serbian
Orthodox, Macedonian Orthodox, Roman Catholic, and Islamic.
3

Among the more hilarious products of recent nationalistic 'historical' investigations is that the
Croats originate in ancient Iran, that the Serbs originate in the Caucasus, and yet earlier in ancient
Mesopotamia, that Islam came to the Balkans independently centuries prior to the Ottoman Turkish
conquest or that the present Macedonians are somehow directly linked with Alexander the Great
of Macedonia.
13

Likewise my own analysis of how this war broke out and what fuels it will be left out
as I have addressed this elsewhere.'' I do not claim that the present war in ex-Yugoslavia
began as a religious war, or is currently a primarily a religious war but it is my contention
that the war has distinct ethno-religious characteristics as these two realities have become so
enmeshed that they cannot be separated.
The interaction of nationality 5 and religion to the point of overlapping and identicalness
is a well known phenomenon in much of Eastern Europe, especially in the Balkans. The
Communist regimes in Yugoslavia and elsewhere tried to rupture this close identification for
both good and bad reasons. A generation or two grew up under Tito, most of them believing
that ethnic and religious distinctions were not unbridgeable and that virulent nationalism
was laid to rest at the end of World War II. We now know that this was not so; ethnoreligious identification returned with a vengeance. Most of the readers may have discovered
this after the Great Transformation in 1989, but it was discernible much earlier. Political
scientists noticed that the phenomenon of 'national Communism' was a powerfully disruptive
factor in the international Communist movement, and it was nurtured by many in the East
and the West with the hope that it will erode Soviet hegemonism. This it did. But one
wonders whether the results are not somewhat akin to nurturing Islamic fundamentalism as
an antidote to Arab socialism or supporting Saddam Hussain as an antidote to Ayatollah
Khomeini's Islamic revolution. In any case Communists were able to dispose neither of
nationalism nor of religion despite having attempted both. As the Communist pterodaktyl
perished and left the nest empty, the eggs hatched an entire flock of birds of pr·ey who are
now viciously pecking at each other in the fight to dominate the entire nest or at least a
segment of the nest.
The large religious communities played a divisive role during the pre--Communist, the
Communist, and the post-Communist period. 6 Yugoslavia was divided not merely into three
4

See "Nationalism, Religion, and Peace in Eastern Europe with Special Reference to Yugoslavia"
in Occasional Papers on Religion in Eastern Europe (hereafter OPREE) Vol. XI, No. 6 (December
1991), pp. 12-31, and "War Between Religions," OPREE, Vol. XII, No.2 (March 1992), pp.i--vi, "The
Reign of Ethnos: Who is to Blame in Yugoslavia?" in Christian Century (November 4, 1993), pp.
996-999, and "Intervening in Bosnia" in Christian Century (April 14, 1993), pp. 388-390.
5

1 prefer the use of the word ethnicity over nationality because some ethnic groups do not have
a state of their own yet possess a yearning for self-governing and sovereignty and because [ believe
that the nation-states of the former Yugoslavia are not nations in the modern sense but are somewhat
akin to tribalism, i.e. that the claim of being a Serb or Croat is closer to the claim of being a Yoruba
or an lbo than being a Swede or a Norwegian.
6

Professor Vjekoslav Bajsic, a Roman Catholic theologian who is teaching at the Roman Catholic
Theological School in Zagreb, explained already in the late 1970s in an interview with this author
that the 2!lly institution that was holding Yugoslavia together was the Yugoslav Communist Party·
(and the army which was under its control) while the religious communities played centripetal roles.
Thus when the Communist Party of Yugoslavia fell apart along the six national component parts,
14

communities: Eastern Orthodox, Roman Catholic, and Muslim but into smaller ethnoreligious units. The Roman Catholic Church of Slovenia reinforced Slovenian nationalism,
Roman Catholic Church u Hrvata 7 supported Croatian nationalism, 8 the Serbian Orthodox
Church supported the idea of Serbdom among Serbs and Montenegrins and tried even to
incorporate the Macedonians, the 'schismatic' autonomous Macedonian Orthodox Church
contributed to the strengthening of Macedonian national awareness, and Islam contributed
to the affirmations of Slavic Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina and adjacent areas (e.g.
Sandzhak) and Albanians in Kosovo, Macedonia, and Montenegro. Orthodox ecclesiology
provides for the formation of national churches but Catholic and Islamic ecclesiology eschews
·such approaches. So for theologiCal, political, and national reasons Roman Catholic leaders
would frequently use the vague term "our" Church but a closer examination would reveal that
"our" was quite limited to their own national unit. Likewise Bosnian and Albanian Muslims
had little interaction with one another. 9 The Roman Catholics of Slovenia perceive
themselves having a quite separate religious dynamic of interaction with their nation than the
Catholic Church among Croats and vice versa. If Roman Catholic ecclesiology allowed it
these churches would in no time call themselves Slovenian Catholic Church and Croatian
Catholic Church. 10
To put it bluntly the leaders of each religious community enthusiastically and uncritically
supported the continuous inflation of nationalism of their respective membership and
frequently attacked the others for allegedly being even more uncritically nationalistic then
· they were. This is analogous to a blind person calling a deaf-mute handicapped!

th~re

_was no longer·a force that could hold the country together.

7

An awkward linguistic term even in Croatian which transliterates even more awkwardly into
English: "in Croats," but could be more freely translated "of Croats" or· "among Croats."
8

This I know from personal experience as I interviewed prominent Roman Catholic theologians
in Slovenia and Croatia who were members of the same Bishops Conference but did not know even
rudimentary data about each other's life while being able to provide detailed analysis of the situation
of their church among their nationals. Another illustration of the ethno-religious separatisms is the
case of a village which in the Zagreb Archdiocese which had a overwhelmingly Slovene population
and was served by a Croat priest. This priest caused great distress among the villagers as only one
of the about twenty masses celebrated per week was in the Slovene language despite the repeated
petitions of his parishioners. They finally requested transfer of their village into the Ljubljana
archdiocese. This took place as recently as 1991/92.
9

1 found in 1969 that the Supreme Islamic headquarters in Sarajevo were quite uninformed and
uninterested in Islam among Albanians.
10

1llustrative of this nationalistic character of religion is the unhappiness among Croats over the
decision of the Vatican to separate the Bishops Conference of Croatia from the Bishops Conference
of Bosnia and Herzegovina--both of whom are Croatian, though no regret was shown over the split
of the Slovenian Bishops' conference.
15

Most of the religious communities contribute to the sacralization of their respective
nationalities, and religion plays the role of a political ideology. As Ivan Cvitkovic remarked,
"the greater the participation in religious activities in a region, the greater the tendency
toward national homogenisation and separatism." 11 Let us now look at several specific cases.

A. Contribution of Religious Communities toward Hatred and War
1. Roman Catholic Contribution to Nationalism 12

Recently two Roman Catholic authors, Geert van Dartet13 and Jure Kristo, 14 as well as
Anne Herbst16 have claimed that the Roman Catholic Church, unlike the Serbian Orthodox
Church, does not claim that Croat equals Catholic and has a more reconciling, ecumenical
posture toward S~rbians. This is simply erroneous and, indeed, can be disproved by the very
data that Jure Kristo provides in support of his own contention.
Josip Beljail in Veritas 16 writes about the role of the Pope and the Holy See. He declares
that they in an unprecedented act became the amplifier of Croatian independence and

11

Ivan Cvitkovic, "God is Dead," in Breakdown: War & Reconstruction in Yugoslavia (London:
Yugofax, 1992), p. 52.
12

I will zero in on the Roman Catholic Church among Croats [Katolicka crkva u Hrvata or
frequently simply Crkva u Hrvata] because I have more data on it and because there is a war in
Croatia.
18

Geert van Dartel, "The Nations and the Churches in Yugoslavia," Religion. State. and Society,
Vol. 20, Nos. 3 & 4 (1992), pp. 275-288. Geert van Dartel is a Roman Catholic priest from Holland
who studied in Zagreb under the late Josip Turcinovic, one of the most liberal Catholic priests who
was rather exceptional in his ecumenical stance, and van Dartel mistakenly ascribes it to the entire
Roman Catholic Church in Croatia. See also his article "Nikolaj Velimirovic (1880-1956)," Glaube
in der 2. Welt, Vol. 21, No.4 (April 1993), pp. 20-26 which is fundamentally sound yet does display
an anti-Serbian Orthodox bias because he tends to ascribe unique enthno-religious bonding among
Serbian theologians, when in fact, this characteristics was far more widely disseminated, especially
among emigre theologians.
14

Jure Kristo, "The Catholic Church in Times of Crisis" and "Diverse Functions of Catholicism
and Orthodoxy in Social Upheavals (1989-1992)" unpublished manuscripts.
16

Anne Herbst, "Tod und VerkHtrung: Die Orthodoxe und die Katholische Kirche im
siidslawischen Konflikt," Glaube in der 2. Welt, Vol. 21, No.4 (April 1993), pp. 14-18.
16

Josip Beljan, "Priznata vjernost," [Recognition of Faithfulness} Veritas (Zagreb), Nos. 9-10,
(September-October, 1992), pp. 24-25. Veritas is a popular Catholic dedicated to St. Anthony of
Padua.
16

sovereignty as a reward to the Croatian people on account of thirteen centuries of their
loyalty to Rome.
God has by way of his Church, by way of the Holy Father, looked at his faithful
people, spoke out on their behalf, directly intervened in history, in the struggle,
warring together with his people ·fnr their liberation . . . With this war God also
returned to his people, in its heart and home. [God] Returned to the entire mass
media, political, social, and state life of Croatia, from where he was driven out 45
years earlier. The cross of Christ stands next to the Croatian flag, Croatian bishop
next to Croatian minister of state. Croatian priest and teacher are again together in
the school. Present at ·masses in churches are officers and Croatian soldiers.
Guardsmen wear rosaries around their necks .... This was truly again a real war for
"the honored cross and golden liberty," for the return of Christ and liberty to Croatia.
The Church is glad.for the return of its people "from the twofold" slavery-Serbian and Communist. This is a great "kairos" of God's grace for the entire
Croatian people. 17
He continues:
Here was not a battle for a piece of Croatian or Serbian land but a war
between good and evil, Christianity and Communism, culture and barbarity,
civilization and primitivism, democracy and dictatorship, love and hatred. . . . Thank
God, it all ended well, due to the Pope and Croatian politics. 18
Another example was an interview carried out by Darko Pavicic, a journalist of the
formerly independent Danas with Franjo Cardinal Kuharic over a gun-toting Franciscan
chaplain, Fra Duka, who was accompanying Croatian troops into battle and who accepted a
political office. To the question of whether he condemns such activity, Cardinal Kuharic
wove a lengthy answer saying that ideally chaplains ought not to go into battle but "when
pater Duka wears a uniform and carries a revolver he is not doing this as a representative of
the Church but it is his private matter. 1119 Since the head of the Franciscan order, in whose
jurisdiction this friar belongs, did not condemn him neither will the Cardinal, though he
would prefer to see him out of uniform. The conclusion that can be drawn from the
Cardinal's response is that such action is permissible and at least will go unpunished by the
church authorities. And, indeed, many priests and seminarians have fought in battles. 20
Jure Kristo characterizes leadership of Cardinal Kuharic as skillfully steering the
Croatian people to sovereignty. He states for instance that in the late 1980s:

17

Ibid., p. 24. Translated from Croatian into English by Paul Mojzes.

18

Ibid., p. 25.

19Darko

Pavicic', "Svecenik nije komesar," [A Priest is not a Commissar] Danas, Vol. 10, No. 503
(October 8, 1991), p. 28.
20

Marko Or!olic, a professor at the Franciscan Theological Seminary in Sarajevo told me that
most of his former students are armed with machine guns defending the city.
17

Unlike his communist compatriots, [sic] cardinal [Kuharic] was not timid about the
defence of national sovereignty. Catholic bishops were convinced that by defending
Croatian sovereignty they were doing something good. Hence, they used every
opportunity to stand in defence of Croat national interests. One such opportunity was
the debate about constitutional amendments concerning the name of [sic] official
language in Socialist Republic of Croatia. 21
They pressed the exclusive use of the Croatian literary language rather than Croato-Serbian
or Serbo-Croatian. Apparently the bishops and other Catholic leaders did not take into
account that this would be threatening to the Serbian population in Croatia who would
naturally interpret it as the denial of their cultural rights and the right to use their
language. 22 Did the Catholic bishops lack the wisdom to promote the rights of the Croatian
people in such a way as not to threaten minority populations? Did they not act anticonstitutionally in their advocacy of a move that would tear apart the federal structure and
provoke a war? Surely they must have known many precedents where civil wars broke out
over the preservation of a federation. Krista proceeds to point out other, at that time still
unconstitutional, initiatives of the Catholic bishops. Namely as soon as they succeeded in
their aim of unseating the Communist Party of Croatia and replacing it with the Croatian
Democratic Union or Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica-:-HDZ (which Krista calls a national
movement rather than a political party--which, indeed, is how the HDZ wishes to be
represented in order to obtain near monopoly over Croatia), they switched attention to Bosnia
and Herzegovina. There they supported the political activity of the HDZ among Croats in
blatant contradiction of the existing law which forbade the creation of political parties on
exclusively national or religious basis. Wrote Krista, "Hence, the Catholic Church made
offers to strike that provision from the books. At the same time, the faithful were
encouraged not to fear organizing themselves on the national and religious basis."23 Indeed
they and other nationalists prevailed. Exclusively national-religious parties were created by
all,..-Croats, Muslims, and Serbs. These parties soon became the three major parties of Bosnia
and Herzegovina. Those who know the national and religious problems of that state know
how fragile the balance of the ingredients was and that the QD!y non-violent alternative was
for a government that could somehow keep all three national-religious groups working

21

Jure Krista, "Diverse Functions of Catholicism ·and Orthodoxy in Social Upheavals (1989-

1992)" pp. 7-8.
22

This would later be aggravated after the victory of the Croatian Democratic Union by the
immediate removal of signs that were both in the Latinic and Cyrillic script which in an
· economically weak country is an expensive move which could only be interpreted by the Serbians
as a decision to obliterate evidence of Serbian presence from Croatia (one should note that in Serbia
to this day signs and newspapers appear in both alphabets) .
.

23

Kristo, "The Catholic Church in Times of Crisis," p. 12.
18

together in a secular context. Thus it is clear that the Roman Catholic bishops initiated the
process of national-religious confrontation, one would guess not out of religious but out of
nationalist motives, because they clearly equate the two. The outcome of that political move
is nothing short of catastrophic, and t-he .Roman Catholic leadership bears a considerable
responsibility for the ensuing tragedy. It does not take great wisdom to see that their
initiatives in this complex area could only lead to war. The Communists, it seems in
retrospect, were far more realistic about ~he national-religious threat than the Roman
Catholic and Croatian leadership.
Another manner in which the Roman Catholic leadership contributed to the tension in
Yugoslavia was their support of'the Albanian cause in the Kosovo. This they did ostensibly
in the name of human rights. It is true that the human rights of Albanians in Kosovo were
severely curtailed by the bloody politics of repression on part of Milosevic's regi~e and that
no decent human being could be silent on this issue, but the leadership of the Roman
Catholic Church was not evenhanded and did not speak out on behalf of other repressed
minorities (especially not of minority rights on the territory of Croatia). Their speaking out
about the Kosovo situation was bound to aggravate the Serbians who do have some legitimate
grievances about the fate of Serbs on Kosovo, though they pressed their interests in a very
brutal and unacceptable manner. The Serbs would naturally interpret these appeals as an
anti-Serb and anti-Orthodox move by the Roman Catholic Church. 24
When the first free elections in Croatia yielded the victory of the HDZ and the Roman
Catholic Church was finally publicly rehabilitated after years of oppression, the Catholic
Church at first seemed to display practically unlimited support of the new regime's superpatriotic Croatianism. The church leadership was present at the opening of the Sabor
(Parliament) sessions; politicians and clergy did not fail to use picture opportunities in order

I'--

to be seen together in the media, and much was done to reinforce the notion of the unity of
the church, nation, and state. 26 Also the church leadership vigorously promoted the cult
of Alojzije Cardinal Stepinac, a controversial figure. Insofar as the Catholic leadership
rejected the labeling of the entire Croatian people by some Serbian extremists as genocidal
and indicated that Stepinac was badly treated by the Communists, they were right, but they
showed too little willingness to express regret for the massacres against Serbians in World War

24

1 use the word 'naturally' because of the Serb memory of Croat/Catholic massacres and
persecutions in World War II, which, of course, are not forgotten and which give rise to fears that
they could be repeated.
26

Cardinal Kuharic' felt the need to explain that he is keeping a distance ..between the Church and
the government despite apparent linkages in his interview to Marinko Culic, "Nismo u narucju
vlasti" [We are not in the Arms of the Government], .I!ru!M, Vol. 9, No. 461 (December 18, 1990),
pp. 20-23.
19

II in which a number of clergy were directly involved and for which Stepinac had a certain
culpability. Geert van Dartel and Anne Herbst mention that Bishop Pihler in 1963 did issue
an apology asking Serbians for forgiveness 26 --one apology by a single Croat bishop in 1963
for the massacre of anywhere from 50,000-700,000 Serbs! 27 During the tense times prior to
the outbreak of the war Serbian bishops often pleaded with the Roman Catholic colleagues
to issue a more emphatic statement of regret and condemnation of the war crimes by Croats
over Serbs in WWII, but more often than not Catholic bishops reacted by minimizing the
casualties and responding with counter complaints that many Croats were killed after the War
by the Partisans. 28 This too, of course, would have been interpreted by the Serbians as a
threat as they wondered whether the Croatians are planning ethnic cleansing as they did in
World War II.
Did the Roman Catholic Church of Croatia contribute to the outbreak of the war in a
nationalist manner? I would answer that with an emphatic yes. The Church leadership
(some more than others) together with Franjo Tudjman made provocative and foolish moves.
They pushed their agenda much too speedily with no regard to the consequences of their
behavior and certainly have to be seen as being among the culprits for the war.
2. Serbian Orthodox Role In the Disintearation of Yuaoslavia
Since the Serbs had far more vested interest in keeping Yugoslavia together than the other
nationalities, it may seem odd that the Serbian Orthodox Church contributed to the outbreak
of hostilities, but they did. They did so by their role in the Kosovo conflict, in whipping up
the claims of the uniqueness of Serbian victimization by others, and later in their uncritical
support of Serbian nationalist aspirations.

26

Van Dartel, op. cit., p. 286 and Herbst, op. cit., p. 16.

27

This is not the place to discuss the numbers of massacred which the Croats tend to diminish
and the Serbs to exaggerate. Even if it were only a thousand of massacred Serbs would it not be
appropriate for the entire Bishop's Conference to issue a statement of regret? After all there were
numerous attempts of forcible conversion of Orthodox to Catholicism and such an act is ecclesiastical.
28

The Austrian Catholic theologian, Dr. Philipp Harnoncourt, provided information in January
1993 to this author that he personally heard at a meeting in Vienna convened by Cardinal K<>ning
to work on reconciling the two churches, a plea by the Orthodox Bishop Irinej of Novi Sad and
Backa that the Roman Catholic Bishops could do much to allay Serbian fears by condemning the
destruction of 500,000 Serbs during World War II, However the Catholic Bishop Djuro Koksa
immediately countered that the charge is exaggerated--there were only 50,000 killed, he claimed-and then did not proceed to apologize even for that number. This author likewise never heard a
Croatian Roman Catholic priest make any statement that could be considered as a condemnation of
the atrocities of the past war.

20

Already in the late 1970s the Serbian Orthodox Church started warning about the
Albanian 'menace' in Kosovo. 29 The population explosion of the Albanians and the exodus
of the Serbs was labeled in a hyperbole as genocide of Serbs. Before too long this claim
was generalized into the claim that the .Serbs in general are threatened on all sides by
conspiracies. 30 As the Yugoslav government cracked down on Albanian demonstrations and
repeatedly repressed dissent concerns were evoked by non-Serbs about violations of the rights
of the Albanians, the Serbian Orthodox C~urch went on a propaganda counter attack by
issuing appeals regarding alleged rapes, murders, expulsions, and destructions of Serbian
cultural monuments and sacred sites--in other words "ethnic cleansing"--by Albanians. 31
This strengthened the Serb resolve not to give up Kosovo and produced powerful antiAlbanian dislike among Serbs.
Another nationalist conflict by the SOC was the Serbian Orthodox Church's: strenuous
opposition to the autonomy of the Macedonian Orthodox Church. The Patriarch of Belgrade
claimed jurisdiction over nearly all Orthodox Churches in Yugoslavia, namely Serbia,
Montenegro and Macedonia. Already at that point it became obvious that Serbian Orthodox
Church leaders and Serbian Communist leaders saw eye to eye on the Macedonian
questions, 32 just as the Macedonian Orthodox Church hierarchy saw eye top eye with the
Macedonian Communists. Tension also arose in the Orthodox Church in Montenegro where
a pro-Serbian branch negated the separateness of the Montenegrins, and a pro-Montenegrin
branch asserted that the Montenegrins ought to insist on the autonomy of their church, as it
was in the past. These two groups occasionally came to literal blows. Neither of these two
conflicts are yet resolved.
As it became evide~t that Yugoslavia was heading toward disintegration after Tito's death
Serbs perceived a threat to their national interests. The leading role in this crisis was played
not by the Church but by the scholars of the Serbian Academy of Sciences (SANU for Srpska
Akademija Nauka i Umetnosti) who issued a Memorandum in 1986. In· that document that

2

~he province is a Serbian national shrine on account of having been the center of the medieval
Serbian kingdom and the site of the fateful Kosovo Field battle in 1389 as well as the location of the
first Serbian Patriarchate in Pee.
30

To the contrary the Serbs were the largest of the national groups in Yugoslavia and were
dominant in the federal army and bureaucracy.
31

E.g "Declaration of the Bishops of the Serbian orthodox Church Against the Genocide Inflicted
by the Albanians on the Indigenous Serbian Population, Together with the Sacrilege of their Cultural
Monuments in their own Country," (Photostated typescript signed by five Serbian Orthodox bishops
of Western countries, September 14, 1988.)
32

Marinko Culic, "Zaruke zvijezde i krsta," [The Engagement of the Star and the Cross], Danas,
Vol. 9, No.436, (May 26, 1990), pp. 28-29.
21

Serbian academics countered the charge that ·Serbians dominated all other nationalities in
Yugoslavia and pictured reality in reverse, namely that the Serbs suffered most for the sake
of

Yugoslavi~

but were the greatest losers and most heavily victimized by the Communist

system and Tito's government.

It was charged that the inter-republican borders were

established unilaterally by Tito, a Croat, with no reference to demographic factors in order
to weaken and damage Serbia. The Yugoslav constitution of 1974 was blamedfor weakening
the Serbs, and a great constitutional conflict took place with the Serbs wanting to change that
constitution while the other nationalities wanted to uphold the constitutional provisions of
the 1974.
The Serbian Orthodox Church soon vigorously joined SANU in vo1cmg Serbian
grievances, in particular incensed by what they regarded as the lack of Croatian Catholic
willingness to atone for their war-time crimes against the Serbian Orthodox population in
Croatia and Bosnia. Prominent Serbian Orthodox bishops and theologians started vigorously
speaking up on behalf of what they considered threatened Serbdom in areas where in World
War II massacres of Serbs took place, in particular the concentration camp of Jasenovac in
Croatia. It was lamented that no Roman Catholic official came to the commemorations to
the victims of Croatian fascist 'ethnic cleansing' during the dedication of the Serbian
.Orthodox Church in Jasenovac. 33 Cries of "never again" could be heard from both nationalist
and church circles. The Serbian Orthodox Church kept reiterating its age-old claim that the
Church always was, is, and will be, even when all others fail, the defender of Serbian
national interests. The gravest threats to Serbdom and Orthodoxy, the hierarchs pointed out,
were Muslims and Cathoiics. The crimes of the Nezavisna Drzava Hrvatska (abbreviated to
NDH and standing for Independent State of Croatia) and the ustashe (Nazi Croatian crack
units similar to the SS) were frequently linked to the Roman Catholic Church and its
leadership. 3 ' The Serbian Orthodox fully sided with other Serb nationalists who saw in the
Croatian independence movement many "ustashoid" elements. 36

33

This author does believe that it was the real aim of Pavelic's regime to have a pure Croatian
"Great Croatia." I am stressing that in order to point out that the Serb attempts at "ethnic cleaning,"
which I under no circumstances support, are in fact retribution for what happened in World War II .
(namely we are witnessing the ending of that war on the Balkans as well as the beginning of the next
round of warfare). The Serbs are carrying out what is popularly known a5 milo za drago or tit for
tat.
s•Among the Serbian publications emphasizing the tie between Croatian nationalism and Roman
Catholicism were Dragoljub Zivojinovic' and Dejan Lucie, varvarstvo y ime Hristovo [Barbarian,ism
in Christ's Name] (1988), Vladimir Dedijer, Yatikan i Jasenovac (The Vatican and Jasenovac) and .
Milan Buhijic, UstaSki zloCini genocida [Ustasa Crimes of Genocide], 1988.
It seeins, inde~d, that too little care was given by the nascent Croatian independence movement
to clearly reject the symbols of the fascist NDH.
36

22

By the late 1980s the anti-Albanian, anti-Slovene, and anti-Croat feelings were conflated,
and the Serbian Orthodox Church saw initially in Slobodan Milosevic's "antibureaucratic
revolution" the salvation and liberation of the Serbian people. Only in 1992 did some
Orthodox leaders, especially Patriarch Paull, see Milosevic's populism as a threat to the wellbeing of the Serbian people. Patriarch Paul I and several other prelates openly criticized the
government of Milosevic at anti-government demonstrations in Belgrade and elsewhere and
charged that the government is harming the interests of the Serbian people.
Jure Kristo and Anne Herbst demonize the role of the Serbian Orthodox Church for
allegedly always supporting the state in contrast to what they perceives as the much more
independent role of the Catholic Church among Croatians. Both of them are too harsh on
the Orthodox Church prelates and theologians and too lenient with the Catholic ones. No

I

1

significant difference in the relationship of these two churches toward their respecHve nation
is in evidence. It is true that the Serbian Orthodox hierarchy was more servile to the former
Yugoslav government than the Roman Catholic hierarchy was, but there are a host of other
plausible explanations for that. In respect to the rise of national chauvinism both churches
contributed heavily. It is symptomatic that parallel to the notion Crkva u Hrvata is its match
Srpska crkva as a synonym for the Orthodox Church. The term Serbian seems to carry more
weight that the term Orthodox. An interesting editorial in Teoloski Pogledi [Theological
Views), the official theological journal of the SOC indicates that there are those who
mistakenly favored only the Serbian national identity as a measure of their adherence to the
Christian church and that in the period of the decline of Communism some people started
identifying the church with the state, blaming the SOC for the errors of government policies
and claiming that this brought about God's wrath upon both the Serbian church and state.
But Dr. Ignjatije Midic, the author of the editorial, rejects this equation. 36 Yet in typical
Orthodox fashion he rejects a sharp division of the worldly (political) and spiritual
(ecclesiastic) domains. 37
The SOC Metropolitan of Sarajevo, Nikolaj Mrdja, was the first Serb leader to point out
that organized rapes were being carried out by Serbian extremists. However for Christmas
1992 the SOC hierarchy issued a sharp statement categorically denying that Serbs have
organized rapes and challenging anyone to name a single concentration camp where such
rapes occurred~ while simultaneously charging that many Serbian women had been raped by
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Muslims and Croats. 88 This case indicates the delicate position of the SOC, namely to
truthfully point out events that it cannot conceivably condone and the need to become the
protector of the national reputation when the entire Serbian nation is demonized by the
outside world.
Like the Roman Catholic Church in Croatia the Serbian Orthodox Church favors
obligatory religious education in schools. 89 Unlike the Croatian Sabor the Assembly
[Skupstina] of the rump Yugoslavia defeated the motion with a large majority. The SOC
worries about the situation of Serbian children being catechized by Roman Catholic teachers
in Croatian schools but seems unconcerned about the fate of non-Orthodox children in the
.event of mandatory Orthodox catechism in schools of Serbia. Serb theologians also undertook
the. defence of Serbs and attack of Croats (and others) when Croatian views critical of Serbs
appear in foreign journals. 40
Neither Orthodox ecclesiology nor Serb nationalism is at ease .with a theology and
patriotism of repentance and sharp criticism of one's own group. To that degree the
criticisms of Herbst, Kristo, and van Dartel are accurate. They fail to see the same failings
in Catholic ecclesiology and Croat nationalism which likewise has difficulty admitting
wrongdoing by their own people. Failings are usually pointed out by the rivals and outsiders;
·the power of internal criticism is left unused ..
3. Bosnian Muslims: Ethno-Religious Ambiguity

The Bosnian Muslims are in the unique and somewhat awkward position of being the
only group of Muslim believers in the world who are also considered Muslim by nationality.
Some claim that national consciousness among the Slavic Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina
came late. Others maintain that the Muslims were the mainstream of Bosnian life, having
come peacefully to Bosnia in the 9th Century and having created a Muslim civilization,
culture, language, script, and so forth. 41 However most scholars contend that Christians of
the former Bosnian Church underwent a mass conversion to Islam in 1436 and later in other
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adjacent areas. ·U One thing is certain: the contemporary Slavic Muslims do not remember
their pre-Islamic religious or ethnic origin. Since they were the ruling class during the rule
of the Ottomans, they were detested by their neighboring Slavic Christians, Orthodox and
Catholics alike. When the Turks withdrew from the Balkan peninsula, the so-called poturice
[Turkicized people] were expected to return to their Christian origins thereby swelling the
ranks of the Orthodox and/or Catholics. When the courting of the Muslims turned out to be
unsuccessful, their Christian population continued their resentment and the Muslims had to
work on their own identity. Some preferred to call themselves Yugoslavs, some Bosnjaks
others Muslims. The Croats and the Serbs vigorously continued to claim that all the Muslims
were converts from their respective religion and nationality. It is most likely that in fact
both Serbian Orthodox and Croatian Catholics converted and in any case repressed their
previous identities so effectively that most of them are unable to regard themselves one or
the other. 43
I am not informed first-hand about the engagement of Muslim religious leaders
enhancing Muslim nationalism in Bosnia. My own personal travels through the region and
the general opinion of observers is that Islam is more a cultural than religious identity for
most Muslims in Yugoslavia and that they may well be one of the most secularized Muslims
in the world, gravitating toward Europe rather than the Muslim world. It is said that the
current President of the Bosnian government, Alija Izetbegovic, at the time when he was a
Communist prisoner wrote a book that some describe as Islamic fundamentalist because
allegedly he aimed to establish Bosnia as an Islamic state in which the Muslim majority would
take over and rule with the help of the shariyat law. 44 It is evident, however, that since he
was elected to a responsible government post, he has consistently pledged himself to a
secular, multi-national and multi-religious state in which everyone's rights would be
respected.
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It is also evident that since the Western world has not given any effective assistance to
the Muslims who are the major losers thus far in the war in former Yugoslavia, that
eventually these Slavic Muslims may be driven into the arms of Islamic fundamentalists who
seem more eager to assist them than others. If this takes place it will be less a conscious and
free decision of the Bosnian Muslims and more an act of a desperate people on the verge of
extermination. The battles between Muslim and Croat forces that broke out in late 1992 and
April and May of 1993 are an evidence that the Muslim-Croat alliance is temporary, driven
only by a common hatred of the Serbs.
4. Macedonian Orthodox Separatism
It is general knowledge that the Macedonian Orthodox Church was supported in its

schism from the Serbian Orthodox Church by Tito's government in order to make a more
determined effort to prove the separateness and identity of a Macedonian nationality. 46 Since
in Eastern Europe one cannot imagine a nationality without its own religion, it was important
to establish an autocephalous or at least autonomous Macedonian church. This was done to
deter Bulgarian, Greek, and Serbian claims that Macedonians are not separate but are parts
of their nationhood. Though one of the last nations in Europe to become free of Turkish
overlordship (1913) and one of the last ethnic groups to proclaim its own national
consciousness, 46 the Macedonians in turn have made some outrageous claims about uniting
Greek, Bulgarian, and Yugoslav Macedonia into a Great Macedonia, a move which has cost
them especially Greek resistance to recognition as an independent, sovereign state upon the
fall of Yugoslavia. 47
Macedonian Orthodox higher clergy have dutifully carried out the task of promoting
Macedonian sovereignty and been fairly effective ambassadors abroad. It is interesting that
the Macedonian Orthodox hierarchs have nurtured fairly good relationships with the Vatican
and the Croatian Catholics--one presumes on the old European principle of being friends
with the enemies of your enemy. There seems to be a minor reconciliation with the Serbian
Orthodox Church since no Orthodox Church in the world was willing to grant autocephaly
to the MOC, and some accommodation will have to be worked out with the SOC which has
very reluctantly granted it autonomy under the domain of the Serbian Patriarchate.
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S. Protestants; Inability to Withstand War Pronaganda
The Protestants, being less than I% of the population are quite marginalized. Generally
the larger churches tended to be chut:c~es. _of national minorities (Hungarians, Slovaks,
Germans). Among the larger Yugoslav nationalities the number of Protestants was quite
insignificant and played only a marginal role.
In the past the free church Protestants, who tended to attract membership from a variety
of national groups (e.g. Baptists, Pentecostals, Seventh-Day Adventists, Methodists) tended
to nurture exemplary harmonious relationships between the members of various nationalities,
and there was hope that these 'gOOd relationships could survive the war. They were also
outspoken in maintaining that God is not a nationalist and that religion ought to reconcile
rather than divide people. 48
But that would have been too good to be true. These formerly unified churches that
worked together wherever they had members on the territory of Yugoslavia now found
themselves in separate countries and had to break up along the new nation-state borders
into separate church organizations.
Then many of the Protestant leaders in Croatia became so morally outraged at what they
perceived, along with the rest of the Croatian people, as Serbian aggression that they
condemned this aggression and urged foreign military intervention against Serbians, often
criticizing foreigners, especially Americans, for inaction. 49 This incensed their fellowreligionists in other states and formerly close colleagues now regard them no longer as peacemakers but war-mongers. 60
On the whole the Protestant communities tend to accept the official propaganda of their
respective new states and often interpret the events the way such propaganda channels them.
This does not mean that they uncritically support all the policies of their governments, but
it does show that even they are unable to bridge the enormous abyss. that now separates
Croats and Serbs, Serbs and Macedonians, etc.
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All Protestant churches have immersed themselves, despite their small size, into relief
work, assisting both international religious relief agencies as well as out of their own means.
Particularly impressive is the work of the Seventh-Day Adventists who at considerable
personal risks to themselves deliver mail and packages to war ravaged areas where no postal
system functions any longer. 51
B. The Reconciling Role of Religious Communities

We already noted that the reconciling role of the religious communities is undeveloped
in comparison to the divisive role. Calfs for peace and reconciliation are not lacking but many
of them did not go beyond platitudes and claims that this or that religion has always stood
for peace. Frequently the call for peace was tempered by strong defensive language rejecting
culpability of one's own side and blame directed toward the other groups. Very few positive
statements have been uttered about other religions and nationalities during these times, which
is not surprising given the cruel treatment meted out to each other.
Of course most people in the churches regret the war (though not all mourn the
disintegration of Yugoslavia). Fewer members of the religious communities can give a sound
assessment of the situation that is not merely a reflection of what they hear from their mass
media. 52 These assessments rarely receive wide circulation. And even fewer are those who
decide to become activists on behalf of peace. Most people see themselves as being victims
of forces far too great for their modest abilities. Survival in tumultuous times is the
overwhelming desire--active peace-making is neither a tradition nor do people have enough
psychic energy left for conflict-resolution. Most are too shell-shocked by the brutality of
the war and the troubled times for their communities and their own person to be able to stem
the confrontational mood throughout the country.
Several remarkable statements have been made, however, by leaders · of religious
communities, both by themselves and in meeting with others. The most significant such
occasions were the meetings between Patriarch Paul I of SOC with the head of the RCC
Bishop's Conference Franjo Cardinal Kuharic. Their first meeting was in Sremski Karlovci
(Serbia) in May 1991, the second in Slavonski Brod (Croatia) in August 1991, the third one
in the Spring of I 992 in St. Gallen, Switzerland, the fourth in Geneva in September I 992,
and the fifth a meeting which the Reis-ul-ulema of the Islamic Community Jakub Selimovski
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also was able to be present at a meeting which was convened by the Conference of European
Churches and the European Catholic Bishops' Conference in Switzerland in early 1993.
The most powerful text emerged out of the Geneva meeting partially reproduced here as
follows:
Following our prayers and conversations, we appeal with one mind and voice
to the faithful of our churches, to the responsible organs of the state, to military
commandos and troops, to all peoples and men and women of our common
geographical and spiritual area, as well as to all international forums and institutions
engaged in the search for a solution or "in the provision of aid to our region and in
our states; and we do not only appeal but demand, on the basis of our spiritual
position and moral responsibility:
1.
Immediately and without condition to cease all hostilities, all bloodshed and all
destruction, in particular to stop the blasphemous and insane destruction of places
of prayer and holy places, Christian and Muslim alike; and that negotiations
between the warring parties be initiated without delay.
2.
Immediately and without condition to liberate all prisoners of war and hostages,
as well as to close all prison camps and to free all those incarcerated in this evil
war.
3.
Immediately and without condition to cease the inhuman practice of ethnic
cleansing, by whomever it is being incited or carried out.
4.
To permit all refugees and deportees to return to their homes and to ensure all
bishops and priests of our churches as well as Islamic spiritual leaders free access
to their flock and undisturbed exercise of their office.
S.
That normal communication and unrestricted circulation be re-established, as well
as the possibility of free movement and settlement for all people, whatever their
religious or national affiliation, and
6
that all suffering people be assured undisturbed and equal access to humanitarian
aid.
Equally with one mind and voice we condemn all crimes and distance
ourselves from all criminals, irrespective of which people or army they belong to or
which church or religious affiliation they claim. We especially express our horror at
the perpetration of extremely immoral misdeeds, at the mistreatment of older and
younger women and girls, which only monsters can perpetrate, no matter what name
they give themselves.
Before God, before humanity and before our own conscience we pledge that
we will use all evangelical means and the full influence of pur office and
responsibility in church and society to work, in our· own states and peoples, decisively
and openly for peace, justice and the salvation of each and every one, for the dignity
and inalienable rights of every individual and every people, for humanity and
tolerance, for forgiveness and love.
We ourselves call, individually and together, for repentance before the God
of love, for conversation and for service to him, that we can live anew as neighbours,
friends and brothers,
Peace to all! 53
Of great importance was the distancing which the prelates took from those who would wage
war in the name of their religion, saying that to do so is the greatest crime against one's own
religion.
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The Christmas message 1992 by all the Orthodox bishops presided by Patriarch Paul I is
likewise very peace oriented. 54 In it the Bishops give an answer why such destruction ensued
after the proclamation of democracy and multi-party elections. The reason is "that the
proclaimed principles were accepted only externally, f-ormally, but in the soul matters stayed
unchanged due to espousing the notion that one can help oneself and one's people more by
doing evil than by good, and that one can defend oneself and one's people from crimes and
criminals by doing the same, namely by means of inhumanity and crimes ..."55 The bishops
proceeded to point out that these attitudes brought about the unhappiness of all the nations
involved in this war, and then they invoked love toward all as mark of Christian discipleship.
The Roman Catholic Archbishop of Belgrade, the Slovene France Perko, also rejected the
linkage between war massacres and religion yet admitted that the coupling is now closer.
While urging patriotism instead of nationalism the Archbishop conceded that many believers
see themselves more as nationalists than Christians due to the deficiency of evangelization. 56
Looking at the leadership in religious communities, it is difficult to find prelates with
a distinct orientation toward peace. The top leadership of the three communities--Orthodox,
Catholic, and Islamic--are more conciliatory than some of their colleagues, but no one
emerged with a Christ-like, Ghandian or Martin Luther King, Jr.-type strategy of resisting
evil. There are minuscule groups of dissenters who oppose the war or who look for alternate
peaceful ways in Belgrade, Zagreb, and Sarajevo. 67 In Sarajevo, for instance, there was a
small group of Catholic, Orthodox, and Muslim clergy led by Marko Orsolic, a Franciscan,
who founded the International Center for Interreligious Dialogue, Justice, and Peace who are
working toward converting one of the military barracks into a dialogue center after the war,
but they are not only isolated but also despised by their own religious community. Some
have already been assassinated by members of their own groups; Orsolic, a Croat, is being
attacked in the Croatian press as a 'communist.' 58
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One of the American peace activists reports that most of the clergy, especially the higher
clergy, in former Yugoslavia have been inundated by foreign ecumenical and fact-finding
delegations, and they feel overburdened by high expectations that the churches can be agents
of reconciliation while they do not se~ _themselves as having that much influence. The
activist reports that it is fairly difficult to find key middle level or higher clergy who wish
to meet with their opposites from other churches. The most that one can expect at the
present moment is relief work by the churches, an effort for which they are neither trained
nor particularly well suited. While some of the church centers seem to be able to effectively
distribute relief based only on need, there are reports of abuses; certain local churches
distribute aid only to regular church-goers of their own denomination or use aid to promote
church attendance.

C. Conclusion
It is difficult to have hope regarding a better future for the devastated and brutalized
people of ex-Yugoslavia, including the religious segment and its institutions. Most people
with whom I spoke or corresponded expect it to become worse before it will become better.
In Dante's "Inferno" there is a sign over hell: "Abandon hope all those who enter." The people
in former Yugoslavia are, indeed, closer to hell than to heaven--at least regarding life here
on earth. The most the religious communities are able to do is to suffer along. Perhaps some
of them learn a lesson that stimulating national chauvinism and separatism rather than
tolerance, pluralism, and concern for fellow-human beings regardless of nationality and
religion is a recipe for hell.
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